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Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code § 78-2a-
3(2)(h) (1988). 
Nature of Proceedings 
The proceeding in the trial court was on a petition by plaintiff for an 
Order to Show Cause why defendant should not be ordered to pay plaintiff one-half 
of his gross military retirement pay as ordered by the divorce decree pursuant to a 
stipulation between the parties. The Domestic Commissioner recommended that 
defendant pay one-half of his "disposable" retirement income as defined by federal 
statute. Upon plaintiffs objection, the matter was reviewed by the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup who ordered that defendant pay one-half of his gross retirement 
income as ordered in the original decree and that defendant pay $1,419.00 represent-
ing the back amount due for the difference between the gross and "disposable" 
retirement income. Defendant has appealed this order. 
Statement of Issues 
There are two similar, but distinct issues presented on appeal. (1) 
Does the trial court have jurisdiction to award the plaintiff spouse more than one-
half of the disposable retirement income of defendant or has the issue been totally 
pre-empted by federal statute? (2) Where the parties agreed by stipulation that 
plaintiff would be paid one-half of the gross retirement income, is the trial court 
precluded from enforcing the original decree entered on the basis of the stipulation? 
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Determinative Statutes 
The statute, the interpretation of which is determinative of this matter, 
is 10 U.S.C. § 1408. This statute is reproduced in its entirety in the Addendum. 
Statement of the Case 
Plaintiff accepts appellant/defendant's statement of the case. 
Summary of the Argument 
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act grants state 
courts the power to treat a retiree's disposable retirement pay as marital property to 
be dealt with according to the laws of the state having jurisdiction. According to the 
laws of the State of Utah, the trial court has broad discretion in distribution of 
marital property. While there is a limit to the amount of retirement income which 
the services will pay directly to the former spouse, there is no statutory or federal 
case law limitation on the amount of retirement income which the state court may, 
in exercise of its discretionary powers, award to the former spouse. 
Defendant entered into a valid, enforceable stipulation which provided 
for payment of one-half of his gross retirement income to plaintiff. The original 
divorce decree was entered based upon this stipulation. Defendant cannot, without 
timely notice and evidence of good cause, avoid responsibility for this payment. 
The trial court's actions in adjusting the property interests of the parties 
are entitled to a presumption of validity and, absent a showing of clear and prejudi-
cial abuse of discretion, should not be overturned on appeal. 
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Argument 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S ENTIRE "DISPOSABLE" RETIREMENT 
INCOME IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION AND 
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACCORDING 
TO THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. THERE IS 
NO STATUTORY LIMITATION ON THE AMOUNT OF 
THE 'DISPOSABLE" RETIREMENT INCOME WHICH 
THE TRIAL COURT CAN AWARD TO PLAINTIFF. 
Section 1408 of Title 10, U.S.C. grants state courts authority to award 
a former spouse part of a former serviceman's retirement income. The legislation 
provides, in part: 
Subject to the limitations of this section, a 
court may treat disposable retired or retainer 
pay payable to a member for pay periods 
beginning after June 25, 1981, either as prop-
erty solely of the member or as property of 
the member and his spouse in accordance with 
the law of the jurisdiction of such court. 
10 U.S.C § 1408(c)(1). Disposable retirement pay is defined at 10 U.S.C. § 
1408(a)(4). Plaintiff concedes that a reasonable reading of the statute grants the trial 
court jurisdiction only over defendant's disposable retirement income as defined by 
the act. 
Congress expressly granted state courts authority to treat all of the dis-
posable retirement pay as marital property. The only restriction expressed in the act 
is the limitation of authority to disposable income. There is no express or implied 
condition imposing upon the trial court a limited authority over only 50% of the 
disposable income. 
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Section 1408(d) deals with direct payments by the government to the 
former spouse. The following subsection (e) states: 
The total amount of the disposable retired or 
retainer pay of a member payable under 
subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of 
such disposable retired or retainer pay. 
10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(1). These sections expressly limit the amount of direct payment 
by the government directly to the former spouse. They do not impose a limitation 
on the amount of marital property, i.e. "disposable retired or retainer pay", which the 
state court may award to the former spouse. 
Defendant cites the recent case of Mansell v. Mansell 490 US ; 
109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989) for the proposition that the trial court may 
not award an amount based upon the retiree's gross retirement pay. In fact, the 
holding in Mansell is very narrow. The question addressed by the court is whether 
the court may exercise jurisdiction over retirement income which has been voluntarily 
waived by the retiree in order to accept disability payments. Noting that reductions 
for disability payments are included in the definition of "disposable retired or retainer 
pay" and that "under the Act's plain and precise language, state courts have been 
granted the authority to treat disposable retire pay as community property", Mansell 
at 109 S.Ct. 2028, the Supreme Court held that the state court had no authority over 
the amounts voluntarily waived. The Mansell decision did not affect the clearly 
stated proposition that the state trial courts may treat the entire disposable amount 
as marital property "in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court." 
Defendant also relies upon Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah App 
6 
1988) for the proposition that plaintiff is prevented from receiving more than 50% of 
his disposable, retirement income. In Greene, the modification ordered by the court 
was based upon an agreement between attorneys for the parties. Greene at 829. 
The Greene court merely approved the modification as "correction of a mistake" and 
did not hold that the attorneys' interpretation of federal law was, in fact, correct. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has examined this question in a case 
with facts essentially the same as the ones before this court. In Deliduka v. Deliduka, 
347 N.W.2d 52 (Minn App 1984) the appellant challenged the award of 50% of his 
gross retirement income to his former wife. In Deliduka. the trial court attempted 
to order direct government payments of one half of the gross retirement income. The 
appellate court concluded: 
A fair reading shows that the act grants the 
authority to treat all disposable retired pay as 
marital property, but limits direct government 
payments to former spouses to 50 percent of 
disposable retired pay (65 percent for multiple 
court orders). This means that a state court 
wishing to award a former spouse more than 
50 percent of disposable retired pay must 
order direct government payments and pay-
ments by the member of the military to his 
spouse. 
Deliduka at 55, emphasis in original. The Minnesota court held in favor of the 
spouse and observed, "The trial court erred only in its method of disbursing pension 
payments to the wife." Id. at 56. 
In Utah, when dealing with military retirement pay, an equal split of the 
distributable portion between the spouses is not mandatory. For example, if the 
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retired spouse "has retained an inequitable share of the marital assets, the court may 
divide the retirement as it sees fit." Maxwell v. Maxwell 754 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah App 
1988) citing Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), emphasis added. 
In the present case, as in Deliduka. it was the intent of the court to 
award plaintiff one-half of the gross retirement income. The trial court properly has 
jurisdiction over the disposable amount and, to the extent the entire disposable 
amount will support the award of one-half of the gross benefits, the court acted 
correctly within its discretion. Defendant has not appropriately challenged the 
discretion of the court in making the award. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO A VALID, ENFORCE-
ABLE STIPULATION UPON WHICH THE DIVORCE 
DECREE WAS ENTERED. DEFENDANT, HAVING 
FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY TO THE COURT FOR 
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE AND PROVIDE 
EVIDENCE OF GOOD CAUSE MUST BE BOUND BY 
THE STIPULATED DECREE. 
The original decree in this matter was ordered based upon a stipulation 
of the parties. Defendant knew what he was agreeing to, entered into a valid stipula-
tion, and cannot now escape his responsibilities based upon a tenuous technicality. 
A valid and binding stipulation exists where (1) the parties have com-
pleted their negotiations, (2) the agreement is reduced to writing, and (3) the agree-
ment is signed and filed with the clerk or read into the record before the court. 
Brown v. Brown. 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App 1987). A valid stipulation is conclu-
sive and binding "unless, upon timely notice and for good cause shown, relief is 
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granted therefrom." Higlev v. McDonald. 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984). Such 
stipulations are also binding in divorce proceedings. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 
820, 832-33 (Utah App. 1989). 
Where the stipulation of the parties gives rise to a division of property 
which is equitable, the court "cannot presume that had the [trial] court made the 
division, it would have fallen into error." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 309 
(Utah 1988). Though the stipulation of the parties is not necessarily binding upon 
the court, it is usually followed unless the court finds it to be unfair or unreasonable. 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App 1987). The trial court "may refuse 
to enforce an agreement upon a specific finding as to why the agreement should not 
be followed. . . In its findings, the trial court must therefore clearly articulate these 
reasons for disregarding the stipulation." Colman at 789, emphasis added. 
Defendant entered into a valid and binding stipulation. He has made 
no effort to procedurally obtain modification of the stipulation based decree by 
proper notice and showing of good cause. Defendant clearly stipulated and intended 
that his former wife receive one-half of his gross military retirement benefits. Absent 
a showing of good cause, defendant should continue to be bound by his stipulation. 
The trial court, therefore, acted properly in holding defendant responsible for that 
amount. 
POINT III 
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE TRIAL COURT HAS CON-
SIDERABLE DISCRETION IN AWARDING PROPERTY 
INTERESTS AND IS ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION 
OF VALIDITY. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW 
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CLEAR AND PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURTS DETERMINATION 
SHOULD STAND. 
"It is well established that in divorces the trial courts are given consider-
able discretion in adjusting the parties' financial and property interests, and their 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.11 Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 
124 (Utah App 1987). See also Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 122 
(Utah App 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has taken a similar position: 
In dividing the marital estate, the trial court 
can enter such orders concerning property and 
alimony as are equitable. Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5 (1987). In making such orders, the trial 
court is permitted broad latitude, and its 
judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so long 
as it exercises its discretion in accordance with 
the standards set by this Court, [citations 
omitted] It is therefore incumbent on the 
appealing party to prove that the trial court's 
division violates these standards. . ." 
Newmever v. Newmever. 748 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987). The trial court's actions 
are granted a presumption of validity and, "Absent a showing of a clear and prejudi-
cial abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with an alimony or property award.11 
Throckmorton at 122. 
Defendant has failed to show clear and prejudicial abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. The order of the trial court should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Conclusion 
The trial court is clearly granted authority to treat the entire disposable 
retirement income of defendant as marital property according to the laws of the State 
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of Utah. There is no limitation, up to the maximum disposable amount, which the 
court may distribute equitably between the parties. The trial court may, in reason-
able exercise of its discretion, award plaintiff a larger share of the retirement income 
than defendant. 
If the trial court erred, it was in the insignificant area of ordering that 
plaintiff be paid 50% of the gross retirement benefits directly by the government. It 
properly should have ordered the direct payment of 50% of the disposable amount 
and payment by defendant of the difference between that amount and 50% of the 
gross amount. 
Defendant has failed either to show grounds why he should not be 
bound by his stipulation or that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in making 
the property award. 
The order of the trial court should, therefore, be affirmed to the extent 
that it awards plaintiff one-half of the gross amount of defendant's retirement income. 
The trial court should be instructed to amend its order to provide that defendant pay 
plaintiff the difference between half of the disposable amount and half of the gross 
amount. 
Respectfully submitted this *T d^ay^ Qf September, 1989. ^ ^ " ^ \ 
David A. McPhie 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that, on the & day of September, 1989, I caused to 
be mailed four (4) copies of Respondent's Brief, postage prepaid, to: 
Franklin L. Slaugh 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
9341 S. 1300 East 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
David A. McPhie 
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Addendum 
1. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 - Payment of retired or retainer pay in com-
pliance with court orders. 
2. Deliduka v. Deliduka. 347 N.W.2d 52 (Minn App 1984). 
10 § 1407 G E N E R A L ' I M I L I T A R Y L A W SUBT* A 
§§ 501(21), 511(53), Dec. 12, 
(0 In the case of a member who is retired under any section of title 14, 
the monthly retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the total amount of 
monthly basic pay which the member received for any 36 months (whether 
or not consecutive) of active duty as a member of a uniformed service. 
(g) In the case of a member whose retired pay is computed under section 
16 of the Coast and Geodetic Survey Commissioned Officers* Act of 1948 
(33 U.S.C 853o), the monthly retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the 
total amount of monthly basic pay which the member received for any 36 
months (whether or not consecutive) of active puty as a member of a uni-
formed service. 
(h) In the case of a member who is retired under section 210(g) or 211(a) 
of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 211(g) and 212(a)), the monthly 
retired pay base is one thirty-sixth of the total amount of monthly basic pay 
which the member received for any 36 months '(whether or not consecutive) 
of active duty as a member of a uniformed service. 
(Added Pub.L. 96-342, Title VIII, § 813(a)(1), Sejjt. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1100, and 
amended Pub.L. 96-513, Title I, § 113(c), Title V,||j 
1980. 94 Stat. 2877. 2908, 2925.) 
Historical Note 
References lit Text. Section 16 of the Subsec. fdXl). Pub.L 96-513, § 501(21), 
Coast and Geodetic Survey Commissioned substituted,!*'or 6383" for "6381, 6383, 6390, 
Officers' Act of 1948 (33 U.S.C 853o), re- 6394. 639& 6398. or 6400". 
fcrrcd to in subsec. (g), U section 16 of Act Effective Date of 1980 Amendment. 
June 3, 1948. c. 390. 62 Stat. 299. which is Amendment by sections 113(c) and 501(21) 
classified to section 853o of Title 33, Naviga-
 o f pUD.L. 06-SS3 effective Sept. S3, $981, but 
lion »nd Navigable Waters.
 t h c tu!honty to prescribe regulations under 
Section 210(g) and 211(a) of the Public the amendment by section 113(c) of Pub.L. 
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 211(g) and 96-513 effective on Dec. 12, 1980, see section 
212(a)), referred to in subsec. (h). are sections 701 of PublL. 96-513. set out as an Effective 
210(g) and 211(a) of Act July 1, 1944, c. 373. Date of 1980 Amendment note under section 
Title II. 58 Stat. 687. 688, which are classified 101 of this title. 
to sections 211(g) and 212(a) of Title 42, The Amendment by section 511(53) of Pub.L. 
Public Health and Welfare, respectively.
 9 6 _ 5 l 3 effective Dec. 12. 1980, see section 
1980 Amendment. Subsec. (a)(1). Pub.L. 701(b)(3) of1 Pub.L. 96-513, set out as an Ef-
96-513. § 511(53). substituted "after Septem* fective Date of 1980 Amendment note under 
ber 7. 1980" for "on or after the date of the section 101 of this title, 
enactment of the Department of Defense Au- Legislative History. For legislative history 
thonzation Act, 1981".
 a n d p u r p o s e 0f P u b .L. 96-342, see 1980 U.S. 
Subsec. (b)(4). Pub.L. 96-513, § 113(c), Code Cong, and Adm.Ncws. p. 2612. Sec, 
added references to sections 633, 634, 635, also, Pub.L. 96-513. 1980 U.S. Code Cong. 
636. and 1251. and Adm.Ncws, p. 6333. 
Cross References 
Computation of retired pay of personnel of— 
Air Force, see section 8991 of this title. 
Army, see section 3991 of this title. 
Coast Guard, see section 423 ot Title 14, Coast Guard.," 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, see section 853o of Title 33, Naviga-
tton and Navigable Waters. »l« 
Computation of retired pay of personnel of Public Health $<rvice— 
Commissioned officers, see section 212 of Title 42, The^ Public Health and Welfare. 
Officers of Regular Corps in full grade twice failing selection for promotion, see section 
211 of Title 42. & 
186 
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Higher retired pay for members of Navy or Marine Corps who serve satisfactorily under tem-
porary appointments, see section 6151 of this title. 
Recomputatton of retired pay to reflect advancement on retired list— 
Air Force, see section 8992 of this title. 
Army1, see section 3992 of this title. 
Retainee Jay of member transferred to Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve when not 
on, active duty, see sectionj6330 of this title. 
Retired grade and pay of— ] 
Enlisted members of Regular'Navy or Marine Corps with thirty or more years of service. 
I see section 6326 of this title. 
Officers with forty and thirty years of service in Regular Navy or Marine Corps or retired 
I while serving as admiral, vice admiral, general, or lieutenant general by virtue of 
I temporary appointment, see section 6325 of this title 
Officers with thirty years of service in Regular Navy or Marine Corps, see section 6322 of 
j this title ; 
Officers with twenty years of service in Navy or Marine Corps, see section 6323 of this 
1 title 
Retired pay of regular officers of Navy or Marine Corps designated for limited duty— 
In grades of lieutenant commander in Navy and of major in Marine Corps for failure of 
1
 selection for promotion, sec section 6383 of this title. 
Upon completion of thirty years of service, see section 6383 of this title. 
Library References 
Armed Services <£=>23.4. CJ.S. Armed Services §§ 80. 114 to 120. 
§ 1 4 0 8 . Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with 
court orders 
(a) In this section: 
(1) "Court" mcans-f-
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Is-
lands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; 
(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 451 of 
title 28) having competent jurisdiction; and 
( O any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country 
with which the United States has an agreement requiring the Unit-
ed States to honor any court order of such country. 
(2) "Court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annul-
ment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, 
or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a 
fina^l decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of di-
vorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, 
ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously 
issued decree), which— 
! (A) is issued in {accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of 
j'j'that court; 
(B) provides for— 
(i) payment of child support (as defined in section 462(b) of 
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b))); 
187 
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(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c) of (he 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 66i(c))); or 
(Hi) division of property (including a division of community 
property); and 
(O specifically provides for the payment of an amount, ex-
pressed in dollars or 3S a percentage of disposable reiired or retain-
er pay, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member to 
the spouse or former spouse of that member. 
(3) "Final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be tak-
en or from which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for 
taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a 
decree from which timely appeal has been |taken and such appeal has 
been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals. 
(4) "Disposable retired or retainer pay" means the total monthly re-
tired or retainer pay to which a member is entitled (other than the 
retired pay of a member retired for disability under chapter 61 of this 
title) less amounts which— 
(A) are owed by that member to the. United States; 
(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired 
or retainer pay of such member, including fines and forfeitures or-
dered by courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and amounts 
waived in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38; 
(O are properly withheld for Federal; State, or local income tax 
purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is authorized or re-
quired by law and to the extent such amounts withheld are not 
greater than would be authorized if sucn member claimed all de-
pendents to which he was entitled; '; 
(D) are withheld under section 3402(i) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 34020)) if such'member presents evidence 
of a tax obligation which supports such: withholding: 
(E) are deducted as Government life.insurance premiums (not 
including amounts deducted for supplemental coverage); or 
(F) are deducted because of an election, under chapter 73 of this 
title to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom 
payment of a portion of such member's retired or retainer pay is 
being made pursuant to a court order under this section. 
(5) "Member" includes a former member. 
(6) "Spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former 
husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date 
of a court order, was married to that member. 
(b) For the purposes of this section— 
(1) service of a court order is effective if— 
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated 
for receipt of service of court orders under regulations prescribed 
pursuant to subsection (h) or, if no agen,{ has been so designated, 
188 
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the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by certi-
fied or registered mail, return receipt requested; 
(B) the court order is regular on its face; 
(Q the court order or other documents served with the court 
1order identify the member concerned and include the social securi-ty number of such member, and 
(D) the court order or other documents served with the court 
[order certify that the rights of the member under the Soldiers' and 
Sailors* Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.App. 501 et seq.) were 
observed; and 
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order— 
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(B) is legal in form; and 
(C) includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice 
that it is issued without authority of law. 
(c)(1), Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposa-
ble retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning 
after June 25, 1981, cither as property solely of the member or as property 
of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction 
of such court. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not cre-
ate any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or 
otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a spouse or former 
spouse. ! 
(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to apply 
for retirement or retire at a! particular time in order to effectuate any pay-
ment under this section. 
(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired or retainer pay of a mem-
ber in the manner described in paragraph (I) unless the court has jurisdic-
tion over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than because of 
military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, (B) his domi-
cile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his consent to the juris-
diction of the court. 
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order 
with respect to the payment of a portion of the retired or retainer pay of a 
member, to the spouse or a former spouse of the member, the Secretary 
shall, subject to the limitations of this section, make payments to the spouse 
or former spouse in the amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of 
the member specifically prbvided for in the court order. In the case of a 
memberjentitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective 
service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 90 days 
after the date of effective service. In the case of a member not entitled to 
receive jretired or retainer .pay on the date of the effective service of the 
court order, such payments shall begin not. later than 90 days after the date 
on which the member first becomes entitled to receive retired or retainer 
pay. 
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(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whon> payments are to be made 
under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10 years 
or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service 
creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or retainer pay, 
payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they include 
an amount resulting from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of 
disposable retired or retainer pay of the member as property of the member 
or property of the member and his spouse. 
(3) Payments under this section shall not be {made more frequently than 
once each month, and the Secretary concerned snail not be required to vary 
normal pay and disbursement cycles for retired Jor retainer pay in order to 
comply with a court order. 
(4) Payments from the disposable retired orj retainer pay of a member 
pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the 
applicable court order, but not later than the date of the death of the mem-
ber or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to whom pay-
ments are being made, whichever occurs first. 
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of 
property (including a division of community property) in addition to an 
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay, the Secretary concerned shall, 
subject to the limitations of this section, pay to the spouse or former spouse 
of the member, from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member, 
any part of the amount payable to the spouse o} former spouse under the 
division of property upon effective service of a final court order of garnish-
ment of such amount from such retired or retainer pay. 
(e)(1) The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a 
member payable under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of such 
disposable retired or retainer pay. 
(2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which 
provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more 
than one former spouse from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a 
member, such pay shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of para-
graph (1)) such court orders on a first-come, firs£served basis. Such court 
orders shall be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (I)) out of 
that amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains after the 
satisfaction of all court orders which have been previously served. 
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under 
this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a 
month to the same spouse or former spouse from the disposable retired or 
retainer pay of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall— 
(i) pay to that spouse the least amount of J disposable retired or re-
tainer pay directed to be paid during that mAhth by any such conflict-
ing court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired or 
retainer pay which remains available for payment of such court orders 
based on when such court orders were effectively served and the limita-
tions of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B)f jof paragraph (4); 
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(U) retain an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay that is 
equal to the lesser of— 
(I) the difference between the largest amount of retired or re-
tainer pay required by any conflicting court order to be paid to the 
spouse or former spouse and the amount payable to the spouse or 
former spouse under clause (i); and 
(II) the amoun} of disposable retired or retainer pay which re-
mains available for payment of any conflicting court order based 
on when such court order was effectively served and the limita-
tions of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and 
(iii) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount of 
that member's disposable retired or retainer pay (less any amount paid 
during such month pursuant to legal process served under section 459 
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid during 
such month pursuant to court orders effectively served under this sec-
tion, other than such conflicting court orders) minus— 
(I) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay paid under 
clause (i); and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer.pay retained 
under clause (ii). 
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under clause 
(ii) of subparagraph (a) until such time as that Secretary is provided with a 
court order which has been certified by the member and the spouse or for-
mer spouse to be valid and applicable to the retained amount. Upon being 
provide^ "with such an ordei, the Secretary shall pay the retained amount in 
accordance with the order. 
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this section 
and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Securi-
ty Act (42 U.S.C 659), both of which provide for payments during a month 
from the retired or retainer pay of the same member, such court orders and 
legal process shall be satisfied on a first-come, first-serve basis. Such court 
orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to 
such orders and legal process and which remain available in accordance 
with the limitations of paragraph (I) and subparagraph (B) of this para-
graph during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal 
process which have been previously served. 
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of the 
disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable by the Secretary con-
cerned under all court order? pursuant to this section and all legal processes 
pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 659) with 
respect to a member may not exceed 65 percent of the disposable retired or 
retainer pay payable to such member. 
(5) A jcourt order which itself or because of previously served court or-
ders provides for the paymept of an amount of disposable retired or retainer 
pay wfuch exceeds the amount of such pay available for payment because of 
the limjt'set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously served 
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court orders or legal process previously served under section 459 of the So-
cial Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for' payment of an amount of 
disposable retired or retainer pay that exceeds the maximum amount per-
mitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not 
be considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. However, 
such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this sec-
tion by the payment to the spouse or former spouse of the maximum 
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay permitted under paragraph (1) 
and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). 
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed jto relieve a member of lia-
bility for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments required 
by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable re-
tired or retainer pay under this section have been made in the maximum 
amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph 
(4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may he enforced by any 
means available under law other than the means provided under this section 
in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) 
has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under subpara-
graph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid. 
(0(1) The United States and any officer or employee of the United States 
shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from retired or retain-
er pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse? pursuant to a court order 
that is regular on its face if such payment is made in accordance with this 
section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (h). 
(2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under regulations 
prescribed pursuant to subsection (h), has the duty to respond to interroga-
tories shall not be subject under any law to any .disciplinary action or civil 
or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of/ any disclosure of informa-
tion made by him in carrying out any of his duties which directly or indi-
rectly pertain to answering such interrogatories, j 
(g) A person receiving effective service of a court order under this section 
shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the date on which 
effective service is made, send a written notice of jisuch court order (together 
with a copy of such order) to the member affected by the court order at his 
last known address. 
(h) The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regulations for the 
administration of this section. 
(Added Pub.L. 97-252, Title X, § 1002(a), Sept. 8, 1982, 96 Stat. 730.) 
Historical Note 
References In Text. Section 462 of the So- 531, Title IV. as added Jan. 4, 1975, Pub.L. 
cial Security Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(2) 93-647 , §){l01(a), *8 Stat. 2357. and 
(n)(i) . (ii). and section 459 of that Act, re- amended, and are classified to sections 662 
ferred to in subsec.' (eX3XA)(iii)„ (4XA), (B). and 659, respectively, of Title 42, The Public 
(5) and (6), are sections 462 of Act Aug. 14, Health and Welfare. 
1935. c. 531. Title IV, as added May 23. 'Ci 
1977, Pub.L. 95-30. Title V, § 501(d). 91 Section 34020) of the Internal Revenue 
Stat. 159, and 459 of Act Aug. 14, 1935, c Code of I 9 & referred to in subsec (a)(4)(D). 
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is classified to section 3402(1) qf Title 26, In-
ternal Revenue Code. 
The Soldiers* and Sailors* Civil* Relief Act 
of 1940. referred to in subsec. (b)OXD). » 
Act Oct.| 17. 1940. c. 888. 54 ;Stat. 1178. 
which is Classified generally to section 501 « 
seq. of the Appendix to Title 50, War and 
National ,Defense. For complete classifica-
tion of this Act to the Code, see section 501 
of the Appendix to Title 50, and Tables vol-
ume. | 
Effective Date: Transition Provisions. 
Section 1006 of Pub.L. 97-252 provided that: 
"(a) The amendments made by this *'l'e 
[enacting this section and sections I072(2)(n, 
1086(c)(3), and 1447(6)-(10) and amending 
sections 1448(a)(3)(A). (B). (b). and 1450(a) 
(4), (0 oC tfus title and enacting provisions set 
out as notes under section 1401 of this title 
and this section] shall take effect on the first 
day of trie first month (Feb. 1. 1983J which 
begins 'more than one hundred and twenty 
days after the date of the enactment of this 
title (Sept. 8. 1982]. 
"(b) Subsection (d) of section 1408 of title 
10. United States Code (subsec '(d) of this 
section], as added by section 1002(a), shall 
apply only" with respect to payments of retired 
or retainer pay for periods beginning on of af-
ter the effective date of this title (Feb. 1. 
1983, provided in subsec. (a) ], but without 
regard to ihc date of any court order. How-
ever, in the case of a court order that became 
final before June 26, 1981, payments under 
such subsection may only be made in accor-
dance with such order as in effect on such 
date and without regard to any subsequent 
modifications. j 
"(c) The amendments made by section 
1003 of this title (enacting section 1447(6) to 
(10) and amending sections 1448(a)(3)(A), 
(B). (b) and M50(aX4). ( 0 of this title] shall 
apply to persons who become eligible to Par* 
ticipate in the Survivor Benefit Plan provided 
for in subchapter II of chapter 73'pf title 1°, 
United Slates Code, (section 1447 et $eq. of 
this title],! before, on, or after the effective 
date of such amendments (Feb. 1. 1983, pro-
vided in subsec. (a) ]. 
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Note 1 
•'(d) The amendments made by section 
1004 of this title (enacting sections I072(2XF) 
and 1086(cX3) and amending section 1076(b) 
of this title] and the provisions of section 
1005 of this title (set out as a note under sec-
tion 1408 of this title] shall apply in the case 
of any former spouse of a member or former 
member of the uniformed services only if the 
final decree of divorce, dissolution, or annul-
ment of the marriage of the former spouse 
and such member or former member is dated 
on or after the effective date (Feb. I, 1983. 
provided in subsec. (a) ] of such amendments. 
"(e) For the purposes of this section— 
"(I) the term 'court order* has the same 
meaning as provided in section 1408(a)(2) 
of title 10. United Slates Code (subsec. (a) 
(2) of this section] (as added by section 
1002 of this title); 
"(2) the term 'former spouse* has the 
same meaning as provided in section 
1408(a)(6) of such title (subsec. (a)(6) of 
this section] (as added by section 1002 of 
this title); and 
**(3) the term 'uniformed services' has 
the same meaning as provided in section 
1408(a)(7) of such title (subsec. (a)(7) of 
this section] (as added by section 1002 of 
this title).*' 
Short Title. For Short Title of Pub.L. 
97-252. Title X. Sept. 8, 1982, 96 Stat. 730, 
constituting - F O R M E R SPOUSES' PRO-
TECTION" provisions, see Short Title of 
1982 Amendments note set out under section 
1401 of this title. 
Commissary and Exchange Privileges. 
Section 1005 of Pub.L. 97-252 provided that: 
"The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
such regulations as may be necessary to pro-
vide that an unremarried former spouse de-
scribed in subparagraph (F)(i) of section 
1072(2) of title 10, United States Code (sec-
tion l072(2XF)(i) of this title] (as added by 
section 1004), is entitled to commissary and 
post exchange privileges to the same extent 
and on the same basis as the surviving spouse 
of a retired member of the uniformed ser-
vices.** 
Notes of Decisions 
Offsets against retired pay 2 
Retroactive effect of court dcctsloos 
t . Retroactive effect of court decisions 
triggered trial court's granting of relief, grant-
ing of certiorari in case In which Supreme 
Court had held that military retirement pen-
sions were not subject to division as commu-
nity property, was not itself change in law, at 
time motion to set aside interlocutory judg-
Eveij'Xthis section should be',given pro- ment was before trial court there was no 
spective'ripplication only where event which change of law sufficient to permit husband to 
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(B) The term "senior enlisted njkmber" means any of the following: 
(i) Sergeant Major of the Ar^ny. 
(ID Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, 
(ill) Chief Master Sergeant of jthe Air Force. 
(lv) Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, 
(v) Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard. 
(Added Pub.L. 99-348, Title 1, f 104(b), July 1,1986,100 Stat 686, and amended Pub.L. 100-180, 
Div. A, Title V, § 512(d)(2), Title XIII, i 1314(b)(6), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat 1090, 1175; Pub.L 
100-456, Div. A, Title XII, § 1233(c). Sept 29, 1988, 102 Stat 2057.) 
References In Text. Section 16 of the Coast Pub.L. 100-180, § 5U(dX2XB). added item in 
and Geodetic Survey Commissioned Officers* Act table relating to section 6334. 
of 1948, referred to in subsec. (g). is classified to <{|ubsec. (i). Pub.L. 100-180. § 1314(b)(6)(A), 
section 853* of Title 33, Navigation and Naviga- inserted "and Vice Chairmen" following "for for-
ble Waters mcF Chairmen" in subsection catchline. 
$ubsec. 0X1). Pub.L 100-180. 
Section 210(g) of the Public Health Seivtce Act, $ 1314(b)(6)(B), inserted "or Vice Chairman" fol-
referred to in subsec. (h), is classified to section lowing "served as Chairman". 
211(g) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.
 P r | o r Provisions. A prior section 1406, Added 
Section 211(a) of the Public Health Service Act, £ £ L. 89-652 § 2(1), Oct. 14, 1966, 80 Stat 
referred to in subsec. (h). is classified to section * » • r c , a t , n« l o bmiUtion. on revocation of retired 
212( ) of Title 42 p a y ' w " redesI8na,ed as section 1338 of this title. 
Legislative History. For legislative history and 
1987 Amendment. Subsec. (d). Pub.L. purpose of Pub.L. 100-180. see 1987 U.S.Code 
100-180, $ 512(dX2XA). substituted "section Cong, and Adm.News. p. 1018. See. also. Pub.L. 
6151 or 6334 of this title" for "section 6151 of this 100-456, 1988 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News. p. 
title". 2503. 
§ 1407. Retired pay base for members whi} first became members after Septem-
ber 7, 1980: high-36 month average 
(a) Use of retired pay base in computing retired pay.—The retired pay or 
retainer pay of any person entitled to that bay who first became a member of a 
uniformed service after September 7,1980, is Computed using the retired pay base or 
retainer pay base determined under this section. 
(b) High-three average—The retired pay iase or retainer pay base of a member 
under this section is the member's high-three1 average determined under subsection 
(c). 
(c) Computation of high-three average.-^ 
(1) Formula.—For the purposes of this section, a member's high-three aver-
age is the amount equal to— J ! 
(A) the total amount of monthly (basic pay to which the member was 
entitled for the member's high-36 mtfnths, divided by 
(B) 36. 
(2) High-36 months defined.— 
(A) General rule.—A member's high-86 months are the 36 months out of 
all the months of active duty served by the member as a member of a 
uniformed service for which the monthly basic pay to which the member 
was entitled was the highest 
(B) Rule for non-regular service retirees.—In the case of a member who 
is entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title or under 
chapter 67 of this title, a member's high-36 months are the 36 months out of 
all the months the member was a member of a uniformed service before 
becoming entitled to retired pay for which the monthly basic pay to which 
the member would have been entitled had he served on active duty during 
those months was the highest jj! 
(d) Limitation for enlisted members retiring with less than 30 years' service.— 
In the case of a member who is retired under Section 8914 or 8914 of this title or who 
is transferred to the Fleet Reserve or Fleets Marine Corps Reserve under section 
6330 of this title, the member's high-36 averaWe shall be computed using only rates 
of basic pay applicable to months of acting duty of the member as an enlisted 
member. 
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the month! 
(e) Special rules for short-term disability retirees.— 
(1) Members entitled to retired pay under section 1201 or 1202.—In the case 
of a member who— 
(A) is entitled to retired pay under section 1201 or 1202 of this title; and 
(B) served on active duty for less than 36 months, 
the months (including any fraction thereof) that the member served on active duty 
shall be deemed to be the member's high-36 months. 
(2)' {Members entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205.—In the case 
of a member who— 
,.(A) is entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title; and 
1(B) was a member of a uniformed service for less than 36 months, 
js (including any fraction thereof) that the member was such a member 
shall be deemed to be the member's high-36 months. 
(O Special rule for members retiring with non-regular service.— 
(1) Disability retirement.—In the case of a member of a uniformed service 
who is entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title (relating to 
members on active duty for 30 days or less), the high-36 average is determined 
as \i the member served on active duty and was entitled to basic pay for the 
member's high-36 months. 
(2) Chapter 67 retirement.—In the case of a person who is entitled to retired 
pay under section 1331 of this title (relating to retired pay for non-regular 
service), the person's high-36 average is determined as if the person served on 
active duty and was entitled to basic pay for the person's high-36 months. 
(g) Definition.—In this section, the term "years of creditable service" means the 
number of years of service creditable to a member in computing the member's 
retired or retainer pay (including V« of a year for each full month of service that is 
in addition to the number of full years of service of the member). 
(Added P,ub,L 99-348, Title I, f 104(b), July 1, 1986. 100 Stat 689.) 
Prior Provisions. A prior section 1407, Added Notes of Decisions 
Pub.L. 96-342, Tide VIII, fi 813(a)(1). Sept. 8. 
1980. 94 Stat: 1100. and amended Pub.L. 96-513. 1. Computation 
Tule I, § 113(c), Title V, {§ 501(21), 511(53), _
 # . . . . . , J J . 
Dec. 12. 1980. 94 Stat. 2877. 2908. 2925, which Erroneous payments should not be included in 
related to determination of retired pay base, was computation of « service member's retired pay 
repealed by Pub L. 99-348, Title I, § 104(b), July base, for purposes of computing raVcntitlement. 
1, 1986, 100 Stat. 686. under this section. 1983, 62 Comp.Gen. 157. 
§ 1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders 
(a) In this section: 
[See main volume for text of (J) J 
(2) "Court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or 
legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved 
property settlement incident to such a decree (including a final decree modifying 
the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or 
legal separation, or a court' ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement 
incident to such previously issued decree), which— 
[See main volume for text of (A) and (B)] 
C) in the case of a (division of property, specifically provides for the 
p'avment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable 
mired or retainer pay/ from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a 
member to the spouse or former spouse of that member. 
1 
[See main volume for text of (3)] 
(4) yDisposable retired or retainer pay" means the total monthly retired or 
retainer pay to which a member is entitled less amounts which— 
[See main volume for text of (A) to (C)J 
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(D) are withheld under section 3402(0 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 (26 U.S.C. 3402(0) if such member presents evidence of a tax obligation 
which supports such withholding; 
(E) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of 
this title, are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that 
chapter computed using the percentage of the member's disability on the 
date when the member was retired (or the date on which the member's 
name was placed on the temporary disability retired list); or 
[See main volume for text\pf(F)t (5) and (6)] 
(b) For the purposes of this section— jj 
(1) service of a court order is effective |f— 
[See main volume for taxi of (A) and (B)] 
(C) the court drder or other documents served with the court order 
identify the member concerned and include, if possible, the social security 
number of such member; and j 
[See main volume for text of (D), (2), (c)J 
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order provid-
ing for the payment of child support or alimony or, with respect to a division of 
property, specifically providing for the payment of an amount of the disposable 
retired or retainer pay from a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the 
member, the Secretary shall make payment^! (subject to the limitations of this 
section) from the disposable retired or retainefpay of the member to the spouse or 
former spouse in an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of child support and 
alimony set forth in the court order and, with respect to a division of property, in the 
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay |Specifically provided for in the court 
order. In the case of a member entitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date 
of the effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 
90 days after the date of effective service. In the case of a member not entitled to 
receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, 
such payments shall begin not later than 90, days after the date on which the 
member first becomes entitled to receive retired or retainer pay 
[See main volume for text of (2) to (4) J 
(5) If a court order described in paragraph \l) provides for a division of property 
(including a division of community property) j in addition to an amount of child 
support or alimony or the payment of an amount of disposable retired or retainer 
pay as the result of the court's treatment of such pay under subsection (c) as 
property of the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to 
the limitations of this section) from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the 
member to the spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of the amount 
payable to the spouse or former spouse under the division of property upon effective 
service of a final court order of garnishment of such amount from such retired or 
retainer pay. 
(eXI) The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member 
payable under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired or 
retainer pay. 
(2) In the event of effective service of more" than one court order which provide 
for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more than one former 
spouse, the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member shall be used to satisfy 
(subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) {such court orders on a first-come, 
first-served basis. Such court orders shall be .satisfied (subject to the limitations of 
paragraph (1)) out of that amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which 
remains after the satisfaction of all court orders' which have been previously served. 
OKA) In the event of effective service ozj conflicting court orders tinker this 
section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a month to the 
same spouse or former spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall— 
O) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired or retainer pay 
the least amount directed to be paid during that month by any 'such conflicting 
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court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired, or retainer pay 
which remains available for payment of such court orders based on when such 
court orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and 
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); 
(ii) retain an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay that b equal to the 
lesser of— 
•f (I) the difference between the largest amount required by any conflicting 
\Court order to be paid to the spouse or former spouse and the amount 
.payable to the spouse or former spouse under clause (i); and 
j | (II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains 
[available for payment of any conflicting court order based on when such 
court order was effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and 
Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and 
[See main volume for text of (Hi) and (B)] 
(4)(A) |ln the event of effective service of a court order under this section and the 
service o( legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
659), both of which provide for payments during a month from the same member, 
satisfaction of such court orders and legal process from the retired or retainer pay 
of the member shall be on a first-come, first-serve basis. Such court orders and 
legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to such orders and 
legal process and which remain available in accordance with the limitations of 
paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this paragraph during such month after the 
satisfaction of ail court orders or legal process which have been previously served. 
[See main volume for text of(B)] 
(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court orders 
provides for the payment of an amount which exceeds the amount of disposable 
retired! or; retainer pay available for payment because of the limit set forth in 
paragraph* (I), or which, because of previously served court orders or legal process 
previously served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), 
provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum amount permitted 
under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to 
be irregular on its face solely, for that reason. However, such order shall be 
considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this section by the payment to the 
spouse or former spouse of the maximum amount of disposable retired or retainer 
pay permitted under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). 
[See main volume for text of (6); (f) to (h)J 
(As amended Pub.L 98-525, Title VI, \ 643(aHd), Oct. 19, 1984. 98 Stat 2547, 254?; Pub.L 
99-661. Div. A, Title VI, § 644(a), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat 3887, as amended Pub.L 100-26. 
f 3(3), Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat 273; Pub.L 100-26, S 7(hXD, Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat 282.) 
Reference* In Text Section 3402(0 of ihe 
Intern*! Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in 
lubsec («X«XD). is classified to section 34020) of 
Title 26, Internal Revenue Code | 
Codification. Section 3(3) of Pub.L! 100-26 
made I technical amendment to the directory 
language of lection 644<i) of Pub.L 99-661 by 
substituting Ttitle 10, United States Code,0* for 
"such tillc'7 which amendment required no 
change in te*|. Such amendment by section 3 of 
Pub.L 100-26 effective as if included in Pub.L 
99-661 when]enacted on Nov. 14, 1986,' see sec-
tion 12(a) of] Pub.L 100-26, set out as a note 
«nder section! 774 of this title. . 
19S7 Amendment Subaec. (»X*)fl>). Pub.L 
100-26, | 7(h|KI). substituted "Internal Revenue 
Code of {»! 916" for Internal Revenue;Code of 
19W Amendment Subsec (a)(4). Pub.L 
99-661, f :644<aKI), t t r u c k o u t **(oth€f <han the 
retired J>*y,jqf a member retired for disability 
under chapter 61 of this title)** preceding "less 
amounts". 
Subsec. <«X<XE)- PubL 99-661, f 644(a)(2). 
added subpar. (E). Former subpar. (H). which 
read "are deducted as Government life insurance 
premiums (not including amounts deducted for 
supplemental coverage); or" was struck out 
1984 Amendment Subsec (aX2XQ- Pub.L 
98-325. f 643(a), added "in the case of a division 
of property," before "specifically provides for**. 
Subsec. (bXIXO- Pub.L 98-325. f 643(b). 
added ", If possible," after "include". 
Subsec. (dXl). Pub.L 91-325, f 643(cXI). 
substituted "providing for the payment of child 
support or alimony or, with respect to a division 
of property, specifically providing for the payment 
of an amount of the disposable retired or retainer 
pay from a member to the spouse or a former 
spouse of the member" for "with respect to the 
payment of a portion of the retired or retainer pay 
of a member to the spouse or a former spouse of 
the member" and substituted "in aa amount sufli-
10 § 1408 ARMED FORCES 34 
dent to satisfy the amount of child support and 
alimony set forth in the court order and, with 
respect to a division of property, in the amount of 
disposable retired or retainer pay specifically pro-
vided for in the court order" for "specifically 
provided for in the court order.** in the first 
sentence 
Subsec (dX5) Pub L 98-525e f 64J(c)(2). 
substituted "child support or alimony or the pay-
ment of an amount of disposable retired or retain-
er pay as the result of the court's treatment of 
such pay under subsection (c) as property of the 
member and his spouse the Secretary concerned 
shall pay (subject to the limitations of this section) 
from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the 
member to the spouse or former spouse of the 
member, any part" for "disposable retired or re-
tainer pay, the Secretary concerned shall, subject 
to the limitations of this section, pay to the spouse 
or former spouse of the member, from the dispos-
able retired or retainer pay of the member, any 
part" 
Subsec (eX2) Pub L 98-525, § 643(d)(1), 
substituted "„ the disposable retired or retainer 
pay of the member" for "from the disposable 
retired or retainer pay of a member, such pay" 
before ' shall be used to satisfy ' 
Subsec (e)(3)(A) Pub L 98-525 
§ 643(dX2XA), struck out "from the disposable 
retired or retainer pay" before "of the same mem 
ber" 
Subsec (eX3XAX0 PubL 98-525, 
§ 643(dX2XB). substituted "from the member's 
disposable retired or retainer pay the least 
amount" for "the least amount of disposable re 
tired or retainer pay" before "directed to be paid' 
Subsec (eX3XAX"XI) PubL. 98-525. 
§ 643(dX2XQ. struck out "of retired or retainer 
pay" before "required by any conflicting" 
Subsec (eX4XA) PubL 98-525, 
§ 643(dX3XA), struck out "the retired or retainer 
pay of* before "the same member" 
Pub L. 98-525, § 643(d), substituted "satisfac-
tion of such court orders and legal process from 
the retired or retainer pay of the members shall 
be" for "such court orders and legal process shall 
be satisfied" before "on a first-come" 
Subsec (eX5) Pub L 98-525, § 643(dX4XA). 
struck out "of disposable retired or retainer pay" 
in two places in the first sentence 
Pub L. 98-525, § 643(dX4)(B), substituted "dis-
posable retired or retainer pay' for "such pay" 
before "available for payment" in the first sen-
tence 
EfTectlre Date of 1986 Amendment Section 
644(b) of PubL. 99-661 provided that "The 
amendments made by subsec'ion (a) [amending 
subsec (aX4). prec subpar (A) and («X*XE) of 
this section] shall apply with respect to court 
orders issued after the date of the enactment of 
this Act [Nov 14, 1986]" 
Effect!™ Date of 1984 Amendment Section 
643(e) of PubL 98-525 provided that 9The 
amendments made by this section [amending sub-
sees (a), (b), (d) and (e) of this section] shall 
apply with respect to court orders for which 
effective service (as described in section 1408(bXl) 
of title 10, United States Code, as amended by 
subsection (b) of this section [subsec. (bXO of this 
section]) is made on or after the date of enactment 
of this Act (Oct 19, 1984]" 
Effective Dates Transition Provisions. Sec-
tion 1006 of Pub L 97-252. as amended by Pub 
L 98-94, Title IX § 94l(cX4). Sept 24, 1983. 97 
Stat. 654, Pub L 98-525. Title VI. § 645(b). Oct 
19, 1984, 98 Stat 2549. provided that 
fSee main volume for text of (a) to (c)J 
"(d) The amendments made by section 1004 of 
this title (enacting sections 1072(2XF) and 
1Q86(CX3) and amending section 1076(b) of this 
tijjje] and the provisions of section 1005 of this 
tide [set out as a note under section 1408 of this 
title] shall apply in the case of any former spouse 
q( a member or former member of the uniformed 
sjervices whether the final decree of divorce, disso-
lution, or annulment of the marriage of the former 
spouse and such member or former member is 
(fated before, on, or after February 1. 1983 
''(e) For the purposes of this section— 
Jj /See main volume for text of (1) and (2)] 
W'O) the term 'uniformed services' has the same 
meaning as provided in section 1072 of title 10, 
ijjnited States Code (section 1072 of this title]" 
i Savings Provisions Reference to law replaced 
by Pub L 100-370 to refer to corresponding pro-
vision enacted by such public law, regulation 
r^ ilc, or order in effect under law so replaced to 
continue in effect under provision enacted until 
repealed, amended or superseded, and action tak 
en'or offense committed under law replaced treat 
ed as taken or committed under provision enacted, 
see section 4 of Pub L 100-370, set out as a note 
tinder section 101 of this title 
,tCommissary and Exchange Prirllcges Section 
1005 of Pub L 97-252 which provided that Secre 
tary of Defense prescribe regulations to provide 
unremarried former spouse commissary and post 
exchange privileges to the same extent and on the 
same basis as the surviving spouse of retired mem 
ber of the uniformed services, was repealed by 
PubL. 100-370, § l(cXS). July 19. 1988 102 
Stat 841 
Legislative History For legislative history and 
purpose of PubL 9S-525, see 1984 U S Code 
Cong and Adm News, p 4174 See, also Pub L 
99-661, 1986 U S Code Cong and Adm News, p 
6413 
West's Federal Practice Manual 
Extension of pension benefits for spouses of 
military personnel, see $ 16897B 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Former spouse payments from retired pay, see 
32 CFR 63 1 et seq 
lisjw Review Commentaries 
['.Applying Louisiana's community property pnn 
ewles to pensions Dian Tooley Arruebarrena, 33 
tbyola (La) L Rev 241 (1987) 
(.Former spouse payments from retired pay of 
uniformed service members Benjamin A Sims, 
11, Ariz Bar J 25 (June/July 1986) 
1 Partitioning military retirement benefits Map 
fhng the post McCarty jungle Justice Robert M 
Campbell and M R. Yogi McKclvcy, 49 Tex B J 
970 (1986) 
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Representing the military spouse Meredith J 
Cohen. 61 FlaBJ 117 (June 1987). 
The trust in marital law Divisibility of a bene-
ficiary spouse's interest on divorce 64 Texas 
LRcv 1301 (1986) 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection 
Act A pakial return of power Michael E. 
Raabe(1983j) II WestStULRev 71 
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Pro-
tection Act of 1982 Problems resulting from its 
application] I (1985) 20 U S F L R 83 
Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection 
Act Stephanie K Cardos, Mary V Perry and 
Timothy S kinnott, 33 Fed Bar News 33 (1986) 
Library References 
Armed Services «=»13 5(1) 
CJS Anjied Services § 114 
Notes of Decisions 
Barred proceedings 16 
Community property 13 
Constitutionality '/• 
Court order | 7 
Declaratory judgment 17 
Delegation of power lb 
Disability benefits 9 
Discretion of court 14 
Disposable benefits 15 
Division of retired pay between spouses 4 
Entitlement and eligibility 11 
Jurisdiction of federal court 5a 
Jurisdiction of state court 5 
Law governing % 
Reopening decision 6 
Retroactive effect of section Vi 
Ripeness doctrine la 
Sufficiency of evidence 12 
Ten year requirement 10 
Treatment of pension as marital property t 
Treatment of retired pay as income 3 
*A Retroactive effect of section 
Former wife was entitled to relief from divorce 
judgment which did not address equitable distri-
bution of former husband's military pension, 
where judgment was entered subsequent to United 
States Supreme Court ruling that such pensions 
were not includable in marital estate for purposes 
of equitable distribution and prior to legislative 
enactment of this section which, by its terms, was 
retroactive to date of the Supreme Court decision 
and provided for inclusion of military pensions in 
marital estates Castigliont v Castigltoni, 1984, 
471 A 2d 809, 192 N J Super 594 ' 
In enacting this section Congress intended to 
obliterate the adverse effect of McCarty upon a 
divorced spouse of military personnel by making it 
retroactive to* the date of that decision Smith v 
Smith. Del Earn Ct 1983, 458 A 2d 711 
Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Afct, which permits application of state 
divorce laws'to military retired pay, did not pro-
hibit dissolution court's division of disability re-
tired pay and, in any event, even if it did the Act 
could not be applied retroactively to an almost 
ten-year bid, dissolution decree, which awarded 
wife one
 t half of husband's military retirement 
10 § 1408 
Not* fe 
benefits, so as to preclude wife from recovering 
one half of husband's military disability retirement 
benefits, final dissolution judgment vesting wife's 
community property interest in husband's military 
retired pay was a property interest that could not 
be denied without due process, disagreeing with 
In r* Marriage ofCosto, 136 Cal App 3d 781, 203 
CalRptr 15 In re Marriage of Stier, 1986, 223 
CaLRptr 599, 178 C A 3 d Supp 1205C. 178 
CA 3d 42, review denied 
For purpose of West's Ann Cal Ctv Code 
| 5124, governing modification of community 
property settlements to include division of military 
retirement benefits, term "final" as applied to 
judgmenu or decrees-means final in sense of bang 
free from further direct attack, regardless of any 
reservation of jurisdiction on pension issue, and, 
thus, statute permits modification of judgments 
and decrees where parties could not have sought 
retroactive application of curative provisions of 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses* Protection 
Act, 10 U S C A. §§ 1408, 1408(cXD. because 
federal legislation was not operative before time 
for direct attack had elapsed In re Marriage of 
Van Dyke 1985. 218 CalRptr II. 172 CA3d 
145 
This section which allows state courts to treat 
disposable retired or retainer pay of retired mem 
ber as community properly was retroactive to 
date of United States Supreme Court decision in 
McCarty, June 26 1981, and was applicable to 
case not final on effective date of this section. Feb 
1, 1983, poor California decisions relative to 
treatment of military pensions as community 
property were controlling on all cases not yet 
final, whether they were filed before, on, or after 
June 26, 1981 In re Marriage of Hopkins, 1983, 
191 Cal Rptr 70, 142 C A 3d 350 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection 
Act provision allowing retirement pay of service 
personnel to be treated as a marital asset [10 
U S C A § 1408(cXD] » retroactive to June 26, 
1981, the date of the United States Supreme 
Court's McCarty decision precluding state courts 
from awarding nonmihtary spouses a portion of 
military spouse's government pension Keen v 
Keen. 1985, 378 N W 2d 612 145 Mich App 824 
Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection 
Act, could be retroactively applied, so as to re-
quire husband to pay military pension proceeds to 
wife retroactively to date of Supreme Court deci-
sion that Act reversed rather than date on which 
award was reinstated Thorpe v Thorpe, 1985, 
367 N W 2d 233, 123 Wis 2d 424 
Retroactive application of Uniform Services 
Former Spouses Protection Act [10 U S C A 
% 1408], permitting division of military retirement 
payments in final dissolution decrees, to dissolu-
tion decrees that were final and not appealed 
during 20-month interim period between judicial 
decuion prohibiting distribution of military retire-
ment payments as part of community property 
and passage of Act, did not divest husbands of 
any vested rights, particularly where husbands 
had been married throughout period prior to ren-
dering of judicial decision when payments were 
considered community property Flannagan v 
Flannagan, 1985, 709 P 2d 1247, 42 Wash App 
214 
Application of statute (10 U S C A . f 1408] 
allowing division of military retired pay upon 
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In the Matter of the Application for the 
Discipline of Harold D. KIMMEL, Jr., 
an Attorney at Law of the State of 
Minnesota. 
No. Cl-81-955. 
Supreme Court of Minnesota. 
April 18, 1984. 
Review Denied July 26, 1984. 
ORDER 
WHEREAS, by decision of this court 
filed July 23, 1982, In re Kimmel, 322 
N,W.2d 224 (Minn. 1982), respondent's prac-
tice has been restricted to examiner of ti-
tles throughout the remainder of his proba-
tion in connection with State of Minnesota 
v. Harold Dean Kimmel, Washington 
County, #4479, Pine County #64-25B; 
and 
WHEREAS, by order of the Washington 
County District Court dated April 2, 1984, 
respondent was discharged from probation; 
and 
WHEREAS, respondent has satisfied all 
current Continuing Legal Education re-
quirements and has paid all past, and cur-
rent attorneyVegistrationfees; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, consist-
ent with the original opinion of this court 
and upon the respondent's demonstrated 
satisfactory completion of the terms of the 
suspension from practice, respondent is re-
instated to practice law. Minn.R.Law.Prof. 
Resp. 18 is deemed inapplicable to these 
proceedings. 
Mary E. DELIDUKA, Respondent, 
v. 
George E. DELIDUKA, Appellant 
No. CO-83-1261. 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota. 
April 4, 1984. 
JEb&i DistrickXourt^Jttright _ County, 
Harold Dahl, J., dissolved marriage and 
made property division and support 
awards, and spouse appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Sedgwick, J., held that (1) 
military retirement benefits are marital 
property; (2) award to wife of 50 percent 
of husband's military retirement benefits 
did not violate Uniform Services Former 
Spouses' Protection Act; (3) failure to 
award permanent maintenance was not 
abuse of discretion; and (4) it was not 
abuse of discretion to order parties to pay 
their respective attorney fees. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=»252.3(4) 
Military pension benefits are "marital 
property" subject to the division on dissolu-
tion of marriage. M.S.A. § 518.54, subd. 5. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
fQr other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Divorce <8=»252„3(4) 
Uniform Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act grants states the authority 
to treat all disposable retired pay as mari-
tal property but limits direct government 
payments to former spouses to 50 percent 
of disposable retired pay and, hence, where 
a nonservice spouse is awarded one-half of 
the gross pension, the service spouse is to 
pay the excess over the 50 percent of dis-
posable pension payable directly by the fed-
eral government to the other spouse. 10 
U.S.C.A. § 1408(a)(4), (c, e), (e)(1), (e)(4XB), 
(e)(6). 
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3. Divorce <s=»252.3(4) 
By labeling its disposition of husband's 
military pension benefits as a division of 
marital property, but structuring install-
ment payments'to former wife over more 
than ten years, the dissolution court antici-
pated Internal Revenue Services treatment 
as periodic payments taxable to wife and 
deductible by husband, notwithstanding 
that tax regulations technically required 
husband to pay withholding on entire 
amount* "and prohibited;^witKKol3rn% f^rohv 
direct pension payments to the wife. 26 
U.S.C.A. §§ 71, 215. 
4. Divorce <s=>253(2), 307 
It could not be said that dissolution 
court miscalculated former husband's in-
come tax rate where other than pay state-
ments reflecting withholding the husband 
made no effort to prove facts concerning 
his income tax liabilities and although he 
alleged that withholding amounts on pay 
stubs did not accurately reflect tax liabili-
ties the substitute figures he offered were 
totally unsupported. 
5. Divorce <3=>286(6), 312.6(8) 
Reviewing court will not disturb disso-
lution jcourt/sjnaintenance or child support 
awards on basis of unsubstantiated claims 
and self-serving figures as to a party's 
income tax liabilities. 
6. Divorce <s=>237 
Factors relevant to award of perma-
nent maintenance are length of marriage, 
spouse's age, family responsibilities, "lack 
of job skills and lack of resources to obtain 
further training or education. 
7. Divorce <s=>286(3) 
Question on appeal is not whether per-
manent maintenance is appropriate but 
whether trial court abused its discretion by 
not awarding it 
8. Divorce e=>247, 308 
Although wife's age, i.e., 48, family 
responsibility in caring for four minor chil-
dren and lack of job skills supported her 
plea for permanent maintenance, it was not 
abuse of discretion to award spousal main-
tenance of $100 for three years, and child 
v. DELIDUKA Minn. 53 
52 (MlnikApp. 1984) 
support of $900 per month considering 
wife's present net income of $714 per 
month as newspaper carrier and security 
afforded by long-term pay out of retired 
husband's military pension. 
9. Divorce <s=*223 
It was not abuse of discretion to order 
each spouse to pay his/her own attorney 
fees. 
10; Divorce e=>223 
Allowance of attorney fees in dissolu-
tion cases rests almost entirely in the dis-
cretion of the trial court 
11. Divorce <3=>286(4) 
Award of attorney fees in dissolution 
case should not be disturbed absent clear 
abuse of discretion. 
12. Divorce <3=>227(1) 
Although there was no abuse of discre-
tion in requiring each spouse to pay their 
respective attorney fees in dissolution pro-
ceeding, husband was ordered to pay wife/ 
$400 for attorney fees on appeal. 
Syllabus by the Court 
1. Military pensions are marital prop-
erty as defined by Minn.Stat § 518.54. 
2. The Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses' Protection Act grants states au-
thority to treat all disposable retired pay as 
marital property, but limits direct govern-
ment payments to former spouses to 50 
percent of disposable retired pay. 
3. The trial court properly refused to 
consider tax considerations not raised at 
trial in calculating the husband's net in-, 
come available for maintenance and chilc^  
support 
4. The trial court's award -of minimal 
temporary maintenance was not an abuse 
of discretion considering the wife's earning 
potential and her share of the njarital prop-
erty. 
5. The trial court's assignment of at-
torney fees was not an abuse of discretion. 
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Medard B. Kaisershot, Crystal, for appel-
lant 
Marilyn J. Michales, Minneapolis, for re-
spondent 
Heard, considered and decided by FO-
LEY, PJ., and WOZNIAK and SEDG-
WICK, JJ. 
OPINION 
SEDGWICK, Judge. 
This is_an*appeal from a dissolution^udg: 
ment and from an order denying a new 
trial. The husband contends that the trial 
court erred by awarding his wife 50 per-
cent of his gross military retirement bene-
fits and by failing to make certain tax 
calculations in determining income availa-
ble for child support and maintenance. 
The wife contends that the court abused 
its discretion by granting her temporary 
rather than permanent maintenance and by 
not requiring her husband to pay her attor-
ney fees. 
Affirmed as modified. 
FACTS 
Mary and George Deliduka were divorc-
ed in June-1983 after 23 years of marriage. 
The Delidukas, ages 48 and 45 respectively, 
had seven children. The children, ages 21, 
20, 18, 17, 15, 13, and 9, all live with Mrs. 
Deliduka. The court granted Mrsc Delidu-
ka custody of all four minor children. 
Mr. Deliduka was an officer in the U.S. 
Air Force during the Delidukas* marriage. 
He retired in 1980 after 20 years of service. 
He has a vested interest in a military 
retirement pension plan. According to a 
retirement pay statement submitted at tri-
al, he receives $1566.46 gross/$1380.04 net 
per month from the pension. 
Mr. Deliduka now works as a training 
coordinator for Trane Sentinel, Inc. Pay 
stubs submitted at trial show that he re-
ceives $957.85 gross/$731.73 net bi-weekly 
from Trane. 
Mrs. Deliduka was a full time homemak-
er from 1960 until 1981. In 1981 to help 
the family meet expenses she took a job as 
an adult newspaper carrier. Her net sala-
ry from the route is approximately $714 
per month. 
The Delidukas' debts at the dissolution 
totalled $16,701.66. Their only significant 
assets were their home and Mr. Deliduka's 
military pension. 
The parties dispute the trial court's treat-
ment of military retirement benefits as a 
marital asset, its award of spousal mainte-
nance oL l^Q_Q_peiLjnonth for three^ years, 
and child support of $900 per month for the 
four minor children, with reductions as 
each child reaches majority, and attorneys 
fees. 
ISSUES 
1. Are military retirement benefits mar-
ital property subject to division be-
tween spouses in a dissolution proceed-
ing in Minnesota? 
2. Does the trial court's award to the 
wife of 50 percent of her husband's 
military retirement benefits violate the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discre-
tion by:" 
a. failing to take into account tax con-
siderations not raised at trial in calcu-
lating Mr« Deliduka's income? 
b. failing to award permanent mainte-
nance to a long term homemaker with 
four minor children? 
c. ordering the parties to pay their 
respective attorney fees? 
ANALYSIS 
[1] 1. Mr. Deliduka contends that the 
trial court erred in treating his military 
pension benefits as martial property. 
Minn.Stat § 518.54, subd. 5, defines mari-
tal property as: 
property, real or perscmal, including 
vested pension benefits or rights;' ac-
quired by the parties, or either of them, 
to a dissolution * * * at any time during 
DELIDUKA 
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the existence of the marriage relation 
between them, (emphasis added) 
Therefore, Mr. Deliduka's military pension 
qualifies as marital property. 
[2] 2. Appellant also challenges the 
award of 50 percent of his gross military 
pension 6eneffts to hfs wife as a viofatfon 
of 10 U.S.C. § 1408, the Uniformed Servic-
es Former Spouses' Protection Act He 
argues that the Act limits the maximum 
portion of military pension benefits a court 
may award to a *ormer spouse to 50 per-
cent of <<disposaljirmifBa^Syr^I)ispbs^-i 
ble retired pay is gross retired pay less 
deductions authorized by 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1408(a)(4).1 
1. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) defines disposable 
retired or retainer pay as: 
[T]he total monthly retired or retainer pay to 
which a member is entitled (other than the 
retired pa> of a member retired for disability 
under chapter 61 of this title) less amounts 
which * * * 
(C) are properly withheld for Federal, State, 
or local income tax purposes, if the withhold-
ing of such amounts is authorized or required 
by law and to the extent such amounts with-
held are not greater than would be authorized 
if such member claimed all dependents to 
which he was entitled; 
2. 10U.S.C. § 1408(c) grants state courts authori-
ty to treat military pensions as military proper-
ty. I t provides: 
Subject to the limitations of this section, a 
court may treat disposable retired or retainer 
pay payable to a member for pay periods 
beginning after June 25, 1981, either as prop-
erty solely of the member or as property of 
the member and his spouse in accordance 
with the law of the jurisdiction of such court. 
"3. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d) permits direct government 
payments to former spouses, subject to certain 
limitations. It provides: 
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary 
concerned of a court order with respect to the 
payment of a portion of the retired or retainer 
pay of a member to the spouse or a former 
spouse of the member, the Secretary shall, 
subject to the limitations of this section, make 
payments to the spouse or former spouse in 
the amount of the disposable retired or retain-
er pay of the member specifically provided 
for in the court order. 
* * * * * * 
(d)(5) If a court order described in paragraph 
(1) provides for a division of property (includ-
ing a division of community property) in ad-
dition to an amount of disposable retired or 
retainer pay, the Secretary concerned shall. 
v. DELIDUKA Minn. 55 
52 (MInnJVpp. 1984) 
The act is new and the United States 
Supreme Court has not definitively inter-
preted its provisions. A fair reading shows 
that the act grants states the authority to 
treat all disposable retired pay as marital 
property,2 but limits direct government 
j?a&'ff?<f&Jif t? former speuses t<? 5t> percent 
of disposable retired pay (65 percent for 
multiple court orders).3 That mearts that a 
state court wishing to award a, former 
spouse more than 50 percent of disposable 
retired pay must order direct government 
•payments-a72(f payments by the member.of-
the military to the spouse.4 
In this case the trial court intended to 
award Mrs. Deliduka one half of her hus-
subject to the limitations of this section, pay 
to the spouse or former spouse of the mem-
ber, from the disposable retired or retainer 
pay of the member, any part of the amount 
payable to the spouse or former spouse under 
the division of property upon effective service 
of a final court order of garnishment of such 
amount from such retired or retainer pay. 
10 U.S.C. § 1408(e) specifies the percentage 
limitations. § 1408(e)(1) provides: 
The total amount of the disposable retired or 
retainer pay of a member payable under sub-
section (d) may not exceed 50 percent of such 
disposable retired or retainer pay. 
And § 1408(e)(4)(D) provides: 
j!lc^wiihsiaading..any^pthec provision of law, 
the total amount of the disposable retired or; 
retainer pay of a mcmbcr*~payable ~by itftf 
Secretary concerned under all court orders 
pursuant to this section and all legal processes 
pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security 
Act (42 VS.C. 659) with respect to a member 
may not exceed 65 percent of the disposable 
retired or retainer pay payable to such mem-
ber. 
4. § 1408(e)(6) provides:" 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
relieve a member of liability for the payment 
of alimony, child support, or other payments 
required by a court order on the grounds that 
payments made out of disposable retired or 
retainer pay under this section have been 
made in the maximum amount permitted un-
der paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of 
paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obliga-
tion of a member may be enforced by any 
means available under law other than the 
means provided under this section in any case 
in which the maximum amount permitted un-
der paragraph (1) has been paid land under 
section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.SoC. 659) in any case in which the maxi-
mum amount permitted under subparagraph 
(B) of paragraph (4) has been paid. 
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band's gross military pension as a division 
of marital property. Since the parties had 
inadequate resources to permit a lump sum 
settlement, the court provided for install-
ment payments to Mrs. Deliduka. 
The trial court tried to give Mrs. Delidu-
ka her half of the gross pension by order-
ing direct government payments to her un-
der 10 ILS.C. § 1408. But, since § 1408 
limits direct payments to former spouses to 
50 percent of disposable retired pay, direct 
payments alone would not result in Mrs. 
Deliduka receiving 50 percentafUhe gross* 
pension. 
The trial court erred only in its method 
of disbursing pension payments to the wife. 
To guarantee its intended division of mari-
tal property, the court, in addition to order-
ing direct government payments, should 
have ordered Mr. Deliduka to make month-
ly supplemental payments. Mrs. Deliduka 
would then receive her ful one-half of the 
gross pension—50 percent of the disposable 
pension would be paid by the federal 
government, and the difference between 50 
percent of gross pension and 50 percent of 
disposable pension would be made by pay-
ments from Mr. Deliduka. 
[3] 3. Mr. Deliduka contends that his 
income available for maintenance and child, 
support was overestimated because the 
court presumed that the parties would each 
pay income tax on their respective halves 
of the pensionc He correctly notes that the 
trial court's income calculations were ex-
pressly premised upon the Deliduka's each 
-paying income taxes on their respective 
halves of the military pension. But his 
argument that he must pay income tax on 
the entire pension, while his wife escapes 
all tax liability, is without merit. 
Tax regulations technically require him 
to pay withholding on the entire amount 
and prohibit withholding from direct pen-
sion payments to his wife. However, he 
will ultimately be liable for income tax only 
on his half of the pension. The trial court 
properly recognized the nature of the pen-
sion asset, i.e., that it was marital property, 
but structured its payout as periodic pay-
ments for tax purposes. By labeling its 
disposition of the pension benefits a divi-
sion of marital property, but structuring 
installment payments over more than 10 
years, the trial court anticipated IRS treat-
ment as periodic payments taxable to Mrs* 
Deliduka under 26 U.S.C. § 71 and deducti-
ble by Mr. Deliduka under 26 U.S.C. § 215. 
Mr. Deliduka has confused tax withhold-
ing with ultimate tax liability and ignores 
the fact that withholding may be adjusted. 
A taxpayer has both the ability and the 
right, under the withholding tax regula-
tions—to "increase -his-maximum allowable 
exemptions to reflect his actual tax obliga-
tion, Mr. Deliduka cites no authority for 
his argument that he is only entitled to 
claim himself and the four minor children 
as exemptions. 
The trial judge recognized that uncer-
tainties about the application of federal tax 
laws and the Uniform Services Former 
Spouses' Protection Act could upset his cal-
culations. So his decree specifically invites 
Mr. Deliduka to come back to court for 
adjustments of support and maintenance 
should he have to pay income tax on more 
than his one-half share of the pension. If, 
after consulting a tax attorney or account-
ants the -planned division of-tax liabilities 
proves impossible, Mr. Deliduka can return 
the matter to the trial court for modifica-
tion of maintenance and child support If 
he does, it will be his obligation to prove 
that the tax treatment carefully considered 
by the trial court to give this family the 
maximum monetary benefit from the pen-
sion division will not work. 
[4] 3a. Mr. Deliduka's claim that the 
trial court miscalculated his income tax 
rate is also unsubstantiated. Other than 
pay statements reflecting withholding for 
taxQs, he made no effort to provide facts to 
the trial court concerning his income ta)c 
liabilities. In a motion for amended find-
ings he alleged that the withholding 
amounts on the pay stubs did not accurai&» 
ly reflect his tax liabilities and offered new 
figures totally unsupported by the trial 
record. On appeal he made spurious argu-
ments on the effect of the tax regulations. 
NELSON v, 
Cltea.J47N.VV.2d57 
[5] We will not disturb the trial court's 
maintenance or child support awards on the 
basis of unsubstantiated claims and self 
serving figures as to a party's income tax 
liabilities. The trial court's net income 
computations are supported by the evi-
dence presented at trial and are not clearly 
erroneous. Therefore, they must stand. 
3b. Mrs. Deliduka argues that the 
court's award of only $100 per month tem-
porary maintenance for three years, and its 
failure £p_ grant permanent maintenance 
constitutes abuse of discfi&diTun'dSfiVIinYir 
Stat § 518.552. 
[6] The length of the marriage, Mrs. 
Deliduka's age, her family responsibilities, 
her lack of job skills, and her lack of re-
sources to obtain further training or educa-
tion all support her plea for permanent 
maintenance. 
[7,8] But the question upon appeal is 
not whether permanent maintenance would 
be appropriate, tut whether the trial court 
•abused its discretion by not awarding it 
The court's minimal maintenance award for 
a limited period was not an abuse of discre-
tion considering Mrs. Deliduka's present 
earnings and the security she is_afforded 
by the long-term payout of *tEe~npensfon 
asset. 
[9-11] 3c. Mrs. Deliduka also contends 
that the trial court abused its discretion by 
not requiring her husband to pay her attor-
ney fees. The court's order that the par-
ties pay their own attorney fees was within 
its discretionary power. Allowance of at-
torney fees in dissolution cases rests al-
most entirely in the discretion of the trial 
court. Solon v. Solon, 255 N.W.2d 395 
(Minn.1977). An award should not be dis-
turbed absent clear abuse of discretion. 
Davis v. Davis, 306 Minn. 536, 235 N.W.2d 
836 (1975). 
DECISION 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed 
and remanded to the trial court with in-
structions to make the following modifica-
tions: 
Mr. Deliduka is hereby ordered to: 
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1. serve notice on the appropriate 
government agency consistent with, the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Pro-
tection Act 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982) to pro-
vide for direct monthly payments to Mrs. 
Deliduka of 50 percent of his disposible 
retired pay. 
2. adjust income tax withholding on the 
military pension by taking the maximum 
allowable exemptions resulting in withhold-
ing reflecting his tax obligation on 50 per-
cent of the gross pension. 
3. make monthly payments to Mrs. Deli-
duka of a sum totaling 50 percent of his 
gross military retirement pay less 50 per-
cent of disposible retired pay. 
[12] In addition, Mr. Deliduka is hereby 
ordered to pay Mrs. Deliduka $400 for at-
torney fees on appeal. 
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Derald-C. NELSON and Carol L. 
Nelson, .Aaftfillajafcs* 
v* 
Curtis R. ENGEN, Defendant, 
National Family Insurance 
Co., Respondent. 
No.-CO-83-1440. 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota. 
April 10, 1984. 
Following declaratory judgment deter-
mining that insurer did not provide cover-
age for certain automobile ownecj by judg-
ment debtor, which automobile was being 
driven by debtor at time of acci&ent from 
which judgment arose, judgment? creditors 
served a garnishment summon! upon the 
insurer and moved for leave to file a sup-
plemental complaint making the insurer a 
